Ned Davis Research firm found that drops of 5 percent or more in the Dow Jones Industrial Average have occurred 355 times since 1900, or an average of 3.3 times a year. Only 31 times did the decline worsen into a bear market, defined as a drop of 20 percent or more. A bear market occurs about once every three years.
So, more than 90 percent of all 5 percent declines don't turn into bear markets.
Ned Davis Research conducted a similar analysis on the Russell 2000, going back to 1979. The small-stock index has experienced 74 dips of 5 percent or more, and nine bear markets. The frequency of declines and bear markets is about the same as for the Dow.
If the decline resumes and worsens, dragging the Dow and the Russell down more than 10 percent from the May 10 peaks, then history suggests there is roughly a 50-50 chance of an outright bear market.
Tuesday, May 30, 2006
Monday, May 29, 2006
avarice
The lust of avarice as so totally seized upon mankind that their
wealth seems rather to possess them than they possess their wealth.
- Pliny the Elder (23-79 A. D.) [from InvestorWords, (5/29/06)]
wealth seems rather to possess them than they possess their wealth.
- Pliny the Elder (23-79 A. D.) [from InvestorWords, (5/29/06)]
Sunday, May 28, 2006
David Dreman and the Long View
SmartMoney's Beverly Goodman interviews David Dreman.
You began your work in behavioral finance with the study of heuristics — essentially, rules of thumb. How does that influence the way people invest?
Heuristics are simple guidelines that we use without thinking. We need them to operate, and they work very well most of the time. For instance, if you're driving down a city street, you focus on what you should see — like other cars, traffic lights, etc.-and ignore everything else, like all the people on the sidewalk and things going on in nearby apartments. Heuristics allow people to concentrate on what's important at that moment. A shortcut, in a sense.
So where do they go wrong?
Heuristics don't work when people aren't good statistical processors. There's been a lot of research on cognitive heuristical errors, such as how people focus on the case rate rather than the base rate of whatever statistics they're evaluating.
Base rate and case rate?
The base rate is the long view. Sharks attack something like one in 5 million swimmers — that's the base rate — but that doesn't stop people from avoiding the water after a highly publicized shark attack or seeing Jaws — the case rate.
How does that apply to the stock market?
With stocks, the base rate is the 10% the stock market has returned on average over decades. The case rate is what the market's been doing for a few weeks or months or even a couple of years. So when we get a bubble, like what we had in the late 1990s, people immediately go over to the case rate — the short-term return — and project that into the future forever. So they end up paying too much for their stocks.
[see also Philip Durell's interview]
You began your work in behavioral finance with the study of heuristics — essentially, rules of thumb. How does that influence the way people invest?
Heuristics are simple guidelines that we use without thinking. We need them to operate, and they work very well most of the time. For instance, if you're driving down a city street, you focus on what you should see — like other cars, traffic lights, etc.-and ignore everything else, like all the people on the sidewalk and things going on in nearby apartments. Heuristics allow people to concentrate on what's important at that moment. A shortcut, in a sense.
So where do they go wrong?
Heuristics don't work when people aren't good statistical processors. There's been a lot of research on cognitive heuristical errors, such as how people focus on the case rate rather than the base rate of whatever statistics they're evaluating.
Base rate and case rate?
The base rate is the long view. Sharks attack something like one in 5 million swimmers — that's the base rate — but that doesn't stop people from avoiding the water after a highly publicized shark attack or seeing Jaws — the case rate.
How does that apply to the stock market?
With stocks, the base rate is the 10% the stock market has returned on average over decades. The case rate is what the market's been doing for a few weeks or months or even a couple of years. So when we get a bubble, like what we had in the late 1990s, people immediately go over to the case rate — the short-term return — and project that into the future forever. So they end up paying too much for their stocks.
[see also Philip Durell's interview]
Friday, May 26, 2006
buy and hold
In my opinion, the greatest misconception about the market is the idea that if you buy and hold stocks for long periods of time, you'll always make money. Let me give you some specific examples. Anyone who bought the stock market at any time between the 1896 low and the 1932 low would have lost money. In other words, there's a 36 year period in which a buy-and-hold strategy would have lost money. As a more modern example, anyone who bought the market at any time between the 1962 low and the 1974 low would have lost money.
- Victor Sperandeo (Trader Vic)
- Victor Sperandeo (Trader Vic)
emerging markets
[9/15/06 investwise] [Says Price Headley] The general consensus for many economists is that Brazil, Russian, Inda, and China will combine to be the prevailing economic powerhouses of this century. They all have GDP's that continue to soar and they've signed trade agreements that assure economic ties for years to come.
One of the main reasons that the BRIC's (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have potential to be the economic powerhouse of the 21st century is their recent adoption of global capitalistic economies. Goldman sachs reported that BRIC economies currently are responsible for 20% of the world growth in GDP. That number will swell to 40% in 2025.
[7/25/06] Morningstar asked international fund managers whether they have been finding bargains in emerging markets after the decline. The answer? No.
[7/9/06] David Herro of Oakmark International writes "Commodities, metals, energy, real estate, global small caps, cyclical stocks, emerging markets… what do they all have in common? All of these asset classes have experienced strong price increases in the past three to five years. In the meantime some of the most secure, profitable, and best run businesses in the world have experienced poor price performance. To us, this spells value. We continue to be enthusiastic about the opportunities we are finding in the forgotten asset class of large, blue chip global companies. About the other asset classes, we must warn: what goes strongly up, also can fall down."
[5/26/06] Schwab has gone neutral on emerging markets, which for moderate portfolios is 0% exposure. "This is the third time in the past three years we've moved to neutral. After the prior two, we ultimately went back to an overweight within several months. It's too soon to say whether we're on that same path again, but for now the risks are ample enough to justify no exposure."
[5/11/06] It is at times like this that contrarian commentators start to get nervous. James Montier, the Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein strategist, is most concerned about emerging markets. He points out that emerging markets have risen 225 per cent since 2003, while developed markets are up 87 per cent. Emerging markets now trade on a valuation discount to developed markets of just 15 per cent, half the post-1995 average.
Furthermore, US mutual fund investors are putting three times as much money into emerging markets as they were in 1993, just before a series of crises in the sector. On average, when mutual fund investors are investing heavily in emerging markets, subsequent three-year returns have been 1.7 per cent; after they have sold, three-year returns have been 15 per cent. The omens do not look good.
One of the main reasons that the BRIC's (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have potential to be the economic powerhouse of the 21st century is their recent adoption of global capitalistic economies. Goldman sachs reported that BRIC economies currently are responsible for 20% of the world growth in GDP. That number will swell to 40% in 2025.
[7/25/06] Morningstar asked international fund managers whether they have been finding bargains in emerging markets after the decline. The answer? No.
[7/9/06] David Herro of Oakmark International writes "Commodities, metals, energy, real estate, global small caps, cyclical stocks, emerging markets… what do they all have in common? All of these asset classes have experienced strong price increases in the past three to five years. In the meantime some of the most secure, profitable, and best run businesses in the world have experienced poor price performance. To us, this spells value. We continue to be enthusiastic about the opportunities we are finding in the forgotten asset class of large, blue chip global companies. About the other asset classes, we must warn: what goes strongly up, also can fall down."
[5/26/06] Schwab has gone neutral on emerging markets, which for moderate portfolios is 0% exposure. "This is the third time in the past three years we've moved to neutral. After the prior two, we ultimately went back to an overweight within several months. It's too soon to say whether we're on that same path again, but for now the risks are ample enough to justify no exposure."
[5/11/06] It is at times like this that contrarian commentators start to get nervous. James Montier, the Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein strategist, is most concerned about emerging markets. He points out that emerging markets have risen 225 per cent since 2003, while developed markets are up 87 per cent. Emerging markets now trade on a valuation discount to developed markets of just 15 per cent, half the post-1995 average.
Furthermore, US mutual fund investors are putting three times as much money into emerging markets as they were in 1993, just before a series of crises in the sector. On average, when mutual fund investors are investing heavily in emerging markets, subsequent three-year returns have been 1.7 per cent; after they have sold, three-year returns have been 15 per cent. The omens do not look good.
Wednesday, May 24, 2006
Bad Management
Bad management can make a good business look lousy, and corrupt management can make a terrible business look great, which is even worse.
The issue is particularly important for value investors. We try to pick up companies that are trading at low prices because they're out of favor with the Wall Street crowd. But often, companies are unpopular because they're known to have less-than-stellar management. So it's critical for value investors to be able to identify bad leadership to avoid companies that are cheap because they just aren't all that valuable.
Richard Gibbons presents six warning signs to help identify such companies.
The issue is particularly important for value investors. We try to pick up companies that are trading at low prices because they're out of favor with the Wall Street crowd. But often, companies are unpopular because they're known to have less-than-stellar management. So it's critical for value investors to be able to identify bad leadership to avoid companies that are cheap because they just aren't all that valuable.
Richard Gibbons presents six warning signs to help identify such companies.
Tuesday, May 16, 2006
market slowdown?
[Shannon Zimmerman writes] In stock market parlance, a "correction" is usually taken to mean a downward swing of 10% or more. As I type, the S&P is off roughly 2.4% from the high it touched earlier this month, which means we still have a way to go before hitting correction territory. Nonetheless, last week's swoon has me wondering if the folks at the Leuthold fund shop are onto something.
As reported in this earlier commentary, Leuthold's merry band of data mavens thinks there's a possibility that "a significant economic slowdown, or possibly a recession, could become increasingly obvious by the second half of 2006."
As the management team put it in a recent letter to investors, "We believe it is a time to be conservative ... not aggressive."
As reported in this earlier commentary, Leuthold's merry band of data mavens thinks there's a possibility that "a significant economic slowdown, or possibly a recession, could become increasingly obvious by the second half of 2006."
As the management team put it in a recent letter to investors, "We believe it is a time to be conservative ... not aggressive."
Sunday, May 14, 2006
international investing
[12/14/06] Getting some international exposure in your portfolio may be one of the best things you can do as an investor. Why? Because such exposure -- whether through individual stocks, mutual funds, or exchange-traded funds -- generally provides you the same or even higher potential returns but at lower risk.
Burton Malkiel, a Princeton professor, drove this point home for me many years ago in his book A Random Walk Down Wall Street. I never forgot this paragraph, concerning his 21-year research period from 1977 to 1997:
It turns out that the portfolio with the least risk had 24% foreign securities and 76% U.S. securities. Moreover, adding 24% [Europe, Australia, and Far East] stocks to a domestic portfolio also tended to increase the portfolio return. In this sense, international diversification provided the closest thing to a free lunch available in our world securities markets. When higher portfolio returns can be achieved with lower risk by adding international stocks, no individual or portfolio manager should fail to take notice.
[6/3/06] Building portfolios with the least amount of risk for a given level of return is the foundation of modern portfolio theory. Including international equities in your portfolio helps reduce risk by adding diversification. Professionally managed endowments and pension funds have long recognized the diversification benefits of an international allocation. According to Pension & Investments, the average allocation to international equity for the top 200 U.S.-based pension funds is about 18% of total fund or 25% of total equity holdings.
We confirmed that portfolios with some exposure to international equities had lower risk (as measured by standard deviation) than an all-domestic portfolio for approximately the same level of return.
[5/14/06] Not all Fools see eye to eye when it comes to investing abroad. Some feel that buying a multinational company like General Electric (NYSE: GE) or Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO) will give them the right amount of overseas exposure without buying an actual foreign company like Sony (NYSE: SNE) or Ericsson (Nasdaq: ERICY).
Burton Malkiel, a Princeton professor, drove this point home for me many years ago in his book A Random Walk Down Wall Street. I never forgot this paragraph, concerning his 21-year research period from 1977 to 1997:
It turns out that the portfolio with the least risk had 24% foreign securities and 76% U.S. securities. Moreover, adding 24% [Europe, Australia, and Far East] stocks to a domestic portfolio also tended to increase the portfolio return. In this sense, international diversification provided the closest thing to a free lunch available in our world securities markets. When higher portfolio returns can be achieved with lower risk by adding international stocks, no individual or portfolio manager should fail to take notice.
[6/3/06] Building portfolios with the least amount of risk for a given level of return is the foundation of modern portfolio theory. Including international equities in your portfolio helps reduce risk by adding diversification. Professionally managed endowments and pension funds have long recognized the diversification benefits of an international allocation. According to Pension & Investments, the average allocation to international equity for the top 200 U.S.-based pension funds is about 18% of total fund or 25% of total equity holdings.
We confirmed that portfolios with some exposure to international equities had lower risk (as measured by standard deviation) than an all-domestic portfolio for approximately the same level of return.
[5/14/06] Not all Fools see eye to eye when it comes to investing abroad. Some feel that buying a multinational company like General Electric (NYSE: GE) or Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO) will give them the right amount of overseas exposure without buying an actual foreign company like Sony (NYSE: SNE) or Ericsson (Nasdaq: ERICY).
Ward Cleaver or Eddie Haskell?
In "Stocks and Bonds" (season five, episode 194), Beaver and Wally take an interest in investing, and Ward decides to let them give it a try and learn about the market firsthand by making an actual investment. What's interesting about this episode is that investors today face many of the same problems Wally and the Beav did more than 40 years ago.
In the episode, Ward steers Beaver and Wally toward a dividend-paying company, Mayfield Power and Light. If that doesn't sound like a nice, safe, and absolutely boring investment, I don't know what does. But the boys are simultaneously tempted by their friend Eddie Haskell to invest in Jet Electro, a company that builds rockets.
In the episode, Ward steers Beaver and Wally toward a dividend-paying company, Mayfield Power and Light. If that doesn't sound like a nice, safe, and absolutely boring investment, I don't know what does. But the boys are simultaneously tempted by their friend Eddie Haskell to invest in Jet Electro, a company that builds rockets.
Thursday, May 11, 2006
Robert Shiller
Mauldin has Shiller on his side...
Stock markets are still expensive and investors could be in for an unpleasant surprise once corporate profits begin to weaken, says the Yale University economist who predicted the crash of 2000-2002.
Robert Shiller, whose 2000 book Irrational Exuberance became a bestseller for its gloomy but accurate forecast, said the current equity market rally is reminiscent of the mid-1930s rebound that followed the Great Crash of ‘29. The Dow Jones industrial average tripled over four years between 1933 and 1936 — only to plunge once again in the run-up to the Second World War.
-- from Trevor at chucks_angels
Stock markets are still expensive and investors could be in for an unpleasant surprise once corporate profits begin to weaken, says the Yale University economist who predicted the crash of 2000-2002.
Robert Shiller, whose 2000 book Irrational Exuberance became a bestseller for its gloomy but accurate forecast, said the current equity market rally is reminiscent of the mid-1930s rebound that followed the Great Crash of ‘29. The Dow Jones industrial average tripled over four years between 1933 and 1936 — only to plunge once again in the run-up to the Second World War.
-- from Trevor at chucks_angels
Saturday, May 06, 2006
scale trading
Scale Trading is a disciplined, mechanical approach to buying low and selling high. It is based on the economic law of Supply and Demand, built on the premise that a physical commodity has an intrinsic value and, therefore, will not likely become valueless.
However, Braden Glett warns that while "scale trading can be a viable strategy when applied to commodity futures, mostly because commodities have inherent value meaning that they cannot decline to zero value. ... [but] individual stocks can and do become worthless on occasion, which is one of the main reasons why scale trading is such an unfit approach for stock investing."
[link from scalenet, 4/24/06]
* * *
Note: Scale trading is an averaging down strategy, which is what Bill Miller does relentlessly.
However, Braden Glett warns that while "scale trading can be a viable strategy when applied to commodity futures, mostly because commodities have inherent value meaning that they cannot decline to zero value. ... [but] individual stocks can and do become worthless on occasion, which is one of the main reasons why scale trading is such an unfit approach for stock investing."
[link from scalenet, 4/24/06]
* * *
Note: Scale trading is an averaging down strategy, which is what Bill Miller does relentlessly.
random observations
Heard the one about the monkey and the typewriter?
“If one puts an infinite number of monkeys in front of (strongly built) typewriters and lets them clap away, there is a certainty that one of them [will] come out with an exact version of the ‘Iliad,’” writes Nassim Nicholas Taleb in a recent book, Fooled by Randomness.
The monkey typist story is an old one, and the key word is “infinite.” But Taleb takes this hoary tale a step further. “Now that we have found that hero among monkeys, would any reader invest his life’s savings on a bet that the monkey would write the ‘Odyssey’ next?”
Taleb’s point is that the past frequently tells us nothing at all about the future, even though many of us believe it does and make investments accordingly. “Think about the monkey showing up at your door with his impressive past performance. Hey, he wrote the ‘Iliad.’”
The lesson here for investors is powerful and frightening. How much can you rely on the track records of investment advisers, mutual fund managers, newspaper columnists, or even the market as a whole in making decisions about your investment portfolio? Not nearly as much as you probably think.
“If one puts an infinite number of monkeys in front of (strongly built) typewriters and lets them clap away, there is a certainty that one of them [will] come out with an exact version of the ‘Iliad,’” writes Nassim Nicholas Taleb in a recent book, Fooled by Randomness.
The monkey typist story is an old one, and the key word is “infinite.” But Taleb takes this hoary tale a step further. “Now that we have found that hero among monkeys, would any reader invest his life’s savings on a bet that the monkey would write the ‘Odyssey’ next?”
Taleb’s point is that the past frequently tells us nothing at all about the future, even though many of us believe it does and make investments accordingly. “Think about the monkey showing up at your door with his impressive past performance. Hey, he wrote the ‘Iliad.’”
The lesson here for investors is powerful and frightening. How much can you rely on the track records of investment advisers, mutual fund managers, newspaper columnists, or even the market as a whole in making decisions about your investment portfolio? Not nearly as much as you probably think.
hot commodities
[7/31/06] Mauldin presents The Absolutle Return letter which expounds on the relations between commododies and recession and expansion. They found "The best environment for commodities is late expansions where the average return both in absolute and relative terms is very attractive."
However what stood out for me was that seeing that bonds blew away both stocks and commodities in times of recession.
[6/7/06] Morningstar's take on commodities
[6/3/06] WITH THE PRICES OF OIL AND INDUSTRIAL METALS like copper, zinc and nickel screaming higher in recent months, such observers as Warren Buffett and Morgan Stanley's Steve Roach have proclaimed that commodity markets are in a bubble destined to burst soon.
But Jim Rogers, fabled hedge-fund manager of the 'Seventies and now ardent commodity bull, finds such talk ridiculous. Indeed, he has been pounding the drum for investing in commodities in recent years in numerous speeches and media interviews, even writing Hot Commodities, a book propitiously published in late 2004 that predicted a coming price boom in everything from aluminum to zinc.
* * *
[5/6/06] The world's commodity markets are making financial history.
They have staged a powerful rally heralding the emergence of a great global economic boom. Take a gander at the price of copper, which has roughly tripled in the last two years.
Oil, the commodity making the biggest headlines, last week soared above $75 a barrel for the first time. Gold, at more than $650 a troy ounce, looks to be mounting a challenge to the record highs set 25 years ago. Silver rocketed 8 percent on Friday when a new trading vehicle, the Ishares Silver Trust exchange-traded fund, made its debut.
All this has produced whoops of vindication from the commodity faithful, who spent the 1980s and 1990s sitting on the sidelines while paper assets such as stocks and bonds prospered.
It has also brought cries of alarm. However long it lasts, many voices of experience say, the commodity rally is headed toward a collapse like the one that ended the last great upsurge, which occurred in the 1970s.
However what stood out for me was that seeing that bonds blew away both stocks and commodities in times of recession.
[6/7/06] Morningstar's take on commodities
[6/3/06] WITH THE PRICES OF OIL AND INDUSTRIAL METALS like copper, zinc and nickel screaming higher in recent months, such observers as Warren Buffett and Morgan Stanley's Steve Roach have proclaimed that commodity markets are in a bubble destined to burst soon.
But Jim Rogers, fabled hedge-fund manager of the 'Seventies and now ardent commodity bull, finds such talk ridiculous. Indeed, he has been pounding the drum for investing in commodities in recent years in numerous speeches and media interviews, even writing Hot Commodities, a book propitiously published in late 2004 that predicted a coming price boom in everything from aluminum to zinc.
* * *
[5/6/06] The world's commodity markets are making financial history.
They have staged a powerful rally heralding the emergence of a great global economic boom. Take a gander at the price of copper, which has roughly tripled in the last two years.
Oil, the commodity making the biggest headlines, last week soared above $75 a barrel for the first time. Gold, at more than $650 a troy ounce, looks to be mounting a challenge to the record highs set 25 years ago. Silver rocketed 8 percent on Friday when a new trading vehicle, the Ishares Silver Trust exchange-traded fund, made its debut.
All this has produced whoops of vindication from the commodity faithful, who spent the 1980s and 1990s sitting on the sidelines while paper assets such as stocks and bonds prospered.
It has also brought cries of alarm. However long it lasts, many voices of experience say, the commodity rally is headed toward a collapse like the one that ended the last great upsurge, which occurred in the 1970s.
popularity contest
A Santa Fe institute study on how people judge music sheds light on investor behavior in the stock market.
Elements of an investor
Mike Norman writes "the most important lesson I've learned -- and the most difficult to learn -- is to master myself and my behavior.
I could dazzle people with my knowledge, but I still couldn't make a dime consistently in the markets.
... I started thinking that maybe the problem was me. I had a "we have met the enemy and it is us" kind of moment. From that point on, I started to focus on what I was doing to sabotage myself and then try to correct it.
Initially, the progress was slow. All of the old habits were taking their time going away. Little by little, however, change was occurring, and with that change came positive results. Soon, the momentum was building in the right direction, and my trading account was growing, too.
Over time, I began to see that the behavioral part is really simple. It can basically be distilled down to four elements: patience, detachment, alignment, and discipline.
I could dazzle people with my knowledge, but I still couldn't make a dime consistently in the markets.
... I started thinking that maybe the problem was me. I had a "we have met the enemy and it is us" kind of moment. From that point on, I started to focus on what I was doing to sabotage myself and then try to correct it.
Initially, the progress was slow. All of the old habits were taking their time going away. Little by little, however, change was occurring, and with that change came positive results. Soon, the momentum was building in the right direction, and my trading account was growing, too.
Over time, I began to see that the behavioral part is really simple. It can basically be distilled down to four elements: patience, detachment, alignment, and discipline.
Friday, May 05, 2006
Is Mauldin still bearish?
[10/23/06] With the market setting new highs, Mauldin reiterates his bear case made in his book, Bull-Eye Investing.
[5/10/06] Over the next 10 years, Mauldin would choose U.S. Treasuries over U.S. stocks. He thinks their 5% yield would outperform the S&P over the next decade. But he also sees opportunities overseas.
* * *
[5/5/06] Is (the widely-read columnist) John Mauldin still bearish?
The answer is pretty much yes.
He makes a good case. Based on the current p/e (or the p/e that he chooses to use), the market is in the highest quintile which has historically led to 0% returns.
Of course, he's been bearish at least since 2002 when the S&P 500 bottomed at 800. It's now at 1300.
[5/10/06] Over the next 10 years, Mauldin would choose U.S. Treasuries over U.S. stocks. He thinks their 5% yield would outperform the S&P over the next decade. But he also sees opportunities overseas.
* * *
[5/5/06] Is (the widely-read columnist) John Mauldin still bearish?
The answer is pretty much yes.
He makes a good case. Based on the current p/e (or the p/e that he chooses to use), the market is in the highest quintile which has historically led to 0% returns.
Of course, he's been bearish at least since 2002 when the S&P 500 bottomed at 800. It's now at 1300.
Wednesday, May 03, 2006
Louis Rukeyser
BOSTON (Reuters) - Louis Rukeyser, a television host and author who helped millions of Americans understand the workings of Wall Street with pun-filled stock market commentary delivered weekly for 32 years, died on Tuesday. He was 73.
Rukeyser died of multiple myeloma at his home in Greenwich, Connecticut, his brother Bud Rukeyser said on Wednesday.
From 1970 until 2002, at 8:30 p.m. on Friday evenings on public television, the dapper journalist began his half hour-long show Wall $treet Week with Louis Rukeyser to the clacking sound of an old stock ticker machine.
Rukeyser reviewed the week's news with witticisms, wordplay and factoids and then moderated a panel discussion. The better the market outlook, the more he liked it, his brother said. The format never changed.
TV Guide called Wall $treet Week one of the best programs of on American television and wrote, "Louis Rukeyser's opening remarks on the week's business events are crafted gems of wry commentary; his airy and adroit handling of his big-shot guests is a pleasure to watch."
Rukeyser died of multiple myeloma at his home in Greenwich, Connecticut, his brother Bud Rukeyser said on Wednesday.
From 1970 until 2002, at 8:30 p.m. on Friday evenings on public television, the dapper journalist began his half hour-long show Wall $treet Week with Louis Rukeyser to the clacking sound of an old stock ticker machine.
Rukeyser reviewed the week's news with witticisms, wordplay and factoids and then moderated a panel discussion. The better the market outlook, the more he liked it, his brother said. The format never changed.
TV Guide called Wall $treet Week one of the best programs of on American television and wrote, "Louis Rukeyser's opening remarks on the week's business events are crafted gems of wry commentary; his airy and adroit handling of his big-shot guests is a pleasure to watch."